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I. INTRODUCTION
This saga begins with an Idaho couple—Mike and Chantell Sackett—small business owners from Bonner County, Idaho, who dreamt one
day they would live in a home they personally built.1 In 2007, not long
after the Sacketts began construction of their house, the Sacketts’
dream was put on hold when Environmental Protection Agency (EPA)
officials visited their property.2 EPA officials informed the Sacketts that
their property contained a wetland and that construction of their home
violated the Clean Water Act (CWA). 3 In EPA’s pursuit of enforcement,
1. See Sackett v. U.S. Env’t Prot. Agency, 132 S. Ct. 1367, 1370 (2012) (discussing
the Supreme Court’s decision, which held that administrative compliance orders are judicially reviewable under the Administrative Procedures Act).
2. See id.
3. Id. at 1368.
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it issued an administrative compliance order directing the Sacketts to
restore their property according to the compliance order or face monetary penalties in the thousands for every day they failed to comply.4 Believing their property did not contain a wetland, the Sacketts brought
suit against EPA under the Administrative Procedures Act (APA).5 After
four long years of litigation, the United States Supreme Court decided to
hear the Sacketts’ case.6 On March 21, 2012, with a 9-0 decision, the
Court ruled in the Sacketts’ favor holding that the Sacketts and landowners everywhere have a right to direct and meaningful judicial review
of administrative compliance orders.7
EPA’s enforcement power is not new. For four decades, EPA had
tremendous, broad power abating and controlling pollution, and ensuring compliance with pollution preventing measures. 8 EPA has been
“strong-arm[ing]” parties, big and small, into compliance since its inception in the 1970s. 9 Furthermore, EPA has significant “resources, tremendous statutory authority, prosecutorial discretion, and judicial deference.”10 However, with the Supreme Court’s decision in Sackett, EPA’s
considerable enforcement power has been largely halted, and its primary enforcement mechanism—the administrative compliance order—is
being questioned.11
In light of the decision in Sackett, this article will attempt to answer the following questions: Will EPA continue to issue administrative
compliance orders? If so, how will administrative compliance orders be
utilized by EPA? Alternatively, will EPA resort to less formal communications, such as notices of violations (NOVs), to ensure compliance? If
so, will NOVs trigger judicial review under the APA?
This article will begin by briefly outlining the historical background
of EPA and the CWA. To understand the future of EPA’s enforcement
power, it is also necessary to understand where EPA and the CWA came
from. Second, this article will set forth EPA’s enforcement scheme and
general enforcement mechanisms under all major federal environmental
4.
5.
6.
7.
8.

Id.
Id.
Id. at 1371.
Sackett, 132 S. Ct. at 1368.
Letter from Richard Nixon, President, U.S., to Congress, U.S. (July 9, 1970),

available at http://www2.epa.gov/aboutepa/reorganization-plan-no-3-1970 (in which Nixon
addressed Congress in 1970 and charged EPA with “protecting the environment by abating
pollution.”).
9. See Kathleen Hartnett White, The EPA’s Overreach Problem, PRARIEPUNDIT
(May 2, 2012), http://prairiepundit.blogspot.com/2012/05/epas-overreach-problem.html.
10. Lowell Rothschild, Despite Sackett Ruling, Industry Still Faces Challenges with
EPA in Permitting and Enforcement Matters, ENERGY L. BLOG (July 19, 2012, 9:16 AM),
http://www.energylegalblog.com/archives/2012/07/19/4014.
11. See Richard E. Glaze Jr., A Detailed Look at the Effects of Sackett v. EPA on
Administrative Enforcement Orders, 42 ENVTL. L. REP. 11030, 11036 (2012) (arguing that
Sackett “will give EPA the incentive to ensure evidence in the record that supports an ACO
is sufficient to withstand judicial review, thereby reducing the potential for issuing orders
not supported by the facts.”).
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statutes. Third, enforcement mechanisms under the CWA will be examined, with a focus on administrative penalties, civil enforcement actions,
and administrative compliance orders. Next, this article will set forth
the facts and procedural history of Sackett, the circuit split prior to
Sackett, a history of pre-enforcement review, and the Supreme Court’s
decision in Sackett. The Sackett test must be wholly understood in order
to comprehend the future of EPA enforcement mechanisms. Lastly, a
list of recommendations will be offered for EPA to implement with a focus on two alternative actions EPA could consider taking: (1) continuing
to issue administrative compliance orders so long as they are altered to
not trigger the final agency action test laid out in Bennett v. Spear;12
and (2) exercising other possible enforcement mechanisms that satisfy
the final agency action test set forth in Bennett v. Spear. The analysis
portion of this article sets forth these alternative actions and provides
empirical data on the status of post-Sackett EPA enforcement, but additional data as to what EPA is doing is further required to understand
the true scope and impact of Sackett.
II. ENVIRONMENTAL PROTECTION AGENCY AND THE CLEAN
WATER ACT: A BRIEF HISTORY
In order to understand the Supreme Court’s decision in Sackett,
the full effect of Sackett on EPA administrative compliance orders, and
the future of enforcement mechanisms under EPA, it is necessary to discuss the EPA and the CWA and where they both began. This section of
the article will first set forth a brief history of EPA: its origin, purpose,
goals, means of enforcement, and broad power over pollution abatement.
And second, this section will discuss the creation of the CWA and how it
has become the principal statute in regulating water pollution within
the United States.
When Congress created EPA in 1970, America was just opening its
eyes to the seriousness of its pollution problem. According to the agency,
EPA was established:
[As] part of the response to growing public concern and a grass
roots movement to “do something” about the deteriorating conditions of water, air, and land. For years, raw sewage, industrial
and feedlot wastes had been discharged into rivers and lakes
without regard for the cumulative effect that made our waters
unfit for drinking, swimming, and boating. . . . For decades
Americans had assumed that air and water were free and plentiful and the industrial community gave little thought to pollution. . . . By the 1960s it was obvious that decisive steps had to

12.

Bennett v. Spear, 520 U.S. 154, 162 (1997).
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be taken to correct this imbalance and to prevent future reoccurrences.13
On July 9, 1970, President Richard Nixon spoke to Congress about
reorganization plans to establish EPA.14 Reorganization Plan No. 3 of
1970 “pull[ed] together into one agency”—what is today known as
EPA—“a variety of research, monitoring, standard-setting and enforcement activities” that were dispersed “through[out] several [other] departments and agencies.”15 Nixon charged EPA with “protecting the environment by abating [and controlling] pollution.”16 The principal roles
and functions of EPA as set forth in 1970 included:


Establish[ing] and enforc[ing] . . . environmental protection
standards consistent with national environmental goals.



Conduct[ing] . . . research on the adverse effects of pollution
and on methods and equipment for controlling it, . . . gathering . . . information on pollution, and . . . us[ing] . . . this information in strengthening environmental protection programs and recommending policy changes.



Assisting others, through grants, technical assistance and
other means in arresting [environmental pollution].



Assisting the Council on Environmental Quality in developing and recommending to the President new policies for the
protection of the environment.17

Nixon insisted on viewing the environment as a whole, stating “the
environment must be perceived as a single, interrelated system.”18 Today, EPA can be summed up as an organized governmental action guarantying the protection of the environment and human health. 19 Furthermore, EPA has become “the primary federal agency for regulating
the national environment.”20 It works to protect the surrounding environment and to ensure that all Americans are protected from significant
health risks.21 Today EPA regulates “air pollution, water pollution, . . .
hazardous waste disposal, pesticides, radiation, toxic substances, and

13. Phil Wisman, EPA History (1970–1985), U.S. ENV’L. PROT. AGENCY (Nov. 1985),
http://www2.epa.gov/aboutepa/epa-history-1970-1985.
14. Nixon, supra note 8; see also Reorganization Plan No. 3 of 1970, 35 F.R. 15623
(Dec. 2, 1970), reprinted in 5 U.S.C. app. at 698 (2012).
15. Nixon, supra note 8.
16. Id.
17. Id.
18. Id.
19. 40 C.F.R. § 1.3 (2013).
20. ROBERT W. COLLIN, THE ENVIRONMENTAL PROTECTION AGENCY: CLEANING UP
AMERICA’S ACT 1 (2006).
21. U.S. ENV’L. PROT. AGENCY, FY 2013 ANNUAL PLAN (2013), available at
http://www.epa.gov/oig/reports/2013/EPA_OIG_FY_2013_Annual_Plan_not508.pdf.
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wildlife.”22 However, this article will be focused particularly on water
pollution, the CWA, and EPA’s enforcement of water quality under the
CWA.
The CWA has a very long history beginning with the River and
Harbor Act of 1886, which was re-codified in the Refuse Act of 1899
(Rivers and Harbors Act of 1899) and ended with the CWA that we
know today.23 Congress modeled the CWA after the Clean Air Act,24 and
today the CWA is the principal federal statute governing water pollution
in the United States.25 Congress enacted the CWA “to restore and maintain the chemical, physical, and biological integrity of the Nation’s waters.”26 EPA, along with other federal, state, and local agencies, oversees
all CWA programs.27
The Refuse Act of 1899 was the federal government’s first attempt
to control water pollution.28 The Act provided that “[i]t shall not be lawful to throw, discharge, or deposit . . . any refuse matter of any kind . . .
other than that flowing from streets and sewers and passing therefrom
in a liquid state into any navigable water of the United States[.]”29 Essentially the Act cemented the federal government’s authority to prevent pollution in navigable waters. 30 Almost fifty years later, Congress
passed the Federal Water Pollution Control Act (FWPCA) on June 30,
1948, so as to “enhance the quality and value of our water resources and
to establish a national policy for the prevention, control and abatement
of water pollution.”31 The FWPCA has been amended several times since
1948: the Water Pollution Control Act Extension of 1952, the Water Pollution Control Act Amendments of 1956, the FWCPA Amendments of
1961, the Water Quality Act of 1965, the Clean Water Restoration Act of

COLLIN, supra note 20, at 1.
N. William Hines, History of the 1972 Clean Water Act: The Story Behind How
the 1972 Act Became the Capstone on a Decade of Extraordinary Environmental Reform, J.
ENERGY & ENVTL. L. 80, 83 (2013), available at http://gwujeel.files.wordpress.com/2013/10/42-hines.pdf.
24. Sackett v. U.S. Env’t Prot. Agency, 622 F.3d 1139, 1144 (9th Cir. 2010), rev’d,
132 S.Ct. 1367 (2012) (citing Laguna Gatuna, Inc. v. Browner, 58 F.3d 564, 565 (10th Cir.
1995)); see also S. Pines Assocs. ex rel. Goldmeier v. U.S., 912 F.2d 713, 716 (4th Cir. 1990)
(citing S. Rep. No. 92 – 414, 92d Cong., 1st Sess. 63 (1971), reprinted in, 1971 U.S. Code
Cong. & Admin. News pp. 3668, 3730).
25. CHRISTOPHER L. BELL ET AL., ENVIRONMENTAL LAW HANDBOOK 317 (Thomas
F.P. Sullivan ed., 20th ed. 2009).
26. 33 U.S.C. § 1251(a) (2006).
27. 33 U.S.C. § 1252(a) (2006).
28. U.S. ENVTL. PROT. AGENCY, A Brief Summary of the History of NPDES,
http://www.epa.gov/region1/npdes/history.html (last visited May 28, 2014).
29. 33 U.S.C. § 407 (2006); see also 33 C.F.R. § 329.4 (2012) (defining “navigable
waters” for purposes of the Rivers and Harbors Act).
30. See 33 U.S.C. § 407 (2006).
31. COLLIN, supra note 20, at 20–21.
22.
23.
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1966, and the Water Quality Improvement Act of 1970. 32 Despite these
many amendments, the FWCPA did not effectively implement the law
set forth by Congress. 33 Thus, the FWCPA underwent a substantial
change in 1972; it was restructured to give the EPA administrator the
authority over water pollution control.34 Today’s CWA traces its origin
to the FWPCA amendments of 1972. 35 The 1972 amendments are known
for accomplishing two important tasks. 36 First, the amendments enacted
broad federal standards and a federal permit program that established
minimum water protections, which were to be observed by the states
and citizens.37 Second, the amendments vested power in EPA and the
U.S. Army Corps of Engineers (the Corps) as enforcement agencies.38
The CWA prohibits “the discharge of any pollutant by any person”
without a permit, into “navigable waters[,]” which are defined as “the
waters of the United States.”39 The term “‘pollutant’” includes, “dredged
spoil . . . rock, [and] sand . . . .”40 Furthermore, “‘discharge of a[ny] pollutant’” means “any addition of any pollutant to navigable waters from
any point source.”41 The Code of Federal Regulations defines “waters of
the United States” as “intrastate lakes, rivers, streams . . . mudflats,
sandflats, wetlands, sloughs, prairie potholes, wet meadows, playa
lakes, or natural ponds . . . .”42 Therefore, a property owner must obtain
a permit prior to discharging fill material (such as soil and rock) into
navigable waters (such as a wetland). If a property owner fails to do so,
they are in violation of the CWA.
The CWA establishes two permit schemes. The first authorizes the
Secretary of the Army, through the Corps, to issue a permit “for the discharge of dredged or fill material into the navigable waters . . . .”43 The
second authorizes EPA to issue a permit for the discharge of pollutants
not including dredged or fill material. 44 Thus, the Corps and EPA share
responsibility in executing and enforcing the CWA’s permit provisions.
32. ROBIN KUNDIS CRAIG, THE CLEAN WATER ACT AND THE CONSTITUTION: LEGAL
STRUCTURE AND THE PUBLIC’S RIGHT TO A CLEAN AND HEALTHY ENVIRONMENT 10–22 (2d
ed., 2009).
33. COLLIN, supra note 20, at 21.
34. Id.
35. See generally id. (giving several examples of how the 1972 amendments fundamentally shifted the way the act is implemented.).
36. See CRAIG, supra note 32, 22–27.
37. Id.
38. Id.
39. 33 U.S.C. § 1311 (2006) (“the discharge of any pollutant by any person shall be
unlawful.”); 33 U.S.C. § 1344 (2006) (“The Secretary may issue permits, after notice and
opportunity for public hearings for the discharge of dredged or fill material into the navigable waters . . . .”); 33 U.S.C. § 1362(7) (2006) (“the waters of the United States.”); Sackett v.
U.S. Env’t Prot. Agency, 132 S. Ct. 1367, 1368 (2012).
40. 33 U.S.C. § 1362(6) (2006).
41. 33 U.S.C. § 1362(12) (2006).
42. 33 C.F.R. § 328.3 (2013).
43. 33 U.S.C. § 1344(a), (g)–(h) (2006).
44. See generally 33 U.S.C. §1342 (2006) (remaining silent on the discharge of
dredged or fill material.).
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Section 404 of the CWA is the principal statute for regulating all
activities within wetland areas.45 Section 404 “has three goals: [1] protect the environment and human health and safety, [2] deter violations,
and [3] treat the regulated community fairly and equitably.” 46 When a
party has violated Section 404 of the CWA, the Corps or EPA may bring
an action to compel the restoration of any property that was filled without the proper permit. 47 Thus, the CWA permits either the Corps or
EPA to engage in enforcement activities and bring an action compelling
the return of any property into compliance. However, the CWA is not
the only environmental statute that permits EPA to compel compliance–
it is one of many. The next section of this article discusses EPA’s enforcement scheme and the many enforcement options at its disposal.
III. EPA’S ENFORCMENT SCHEME & ENFORCEMENT
MECHANISMS UNDER ENVIRONMENTAL STATUTES
GENERALLY
EPA faces many “obstacles in effectively enforcing environmental
laws.”48 First, the agency is outnumbered because there are more regulated entities than EPA employees.49 Second, the “geographic dispersal
of [these] entities across the country” is large.”50 Third, the agency faces
travel and budgetary restrictions.51 Fourth, a factual record is required
prior to judicial enforcement, which takes time and resources to gather.52 Finally, “the passage of time between the acts [causing] . . . the alleged violation and” EPA’s action can be lengthy. 53 EPA relies on a
number of civil enforcement mechanisms “to help it overcome these obstacles.” 54 Generally, enforcement mechanisms under all of the major
federal environmental statutes governed by EPA include:


Administrative penalties imposed by agencies for various
violations;



Administrative orders to respond to violations;



Civil actions for relief;

45. See BELL ET AL., supra note 25, at 359.
46. Water: Outreach & Communication, Section 404 Enforcement, EPA,
http://water.epa.gov/type/wetlands/outreach/fact15.cfm (last updated Oct. 9, 2012).
47. See BELL ET AT., supra note 25, at 364–65.
48. Lowell Rothschild, Before and After Sackett v. U.S. Environmental Protection
Agency, 59 FED. LAW. 46–47 (2012).
49. Id.
50. Id.
51. Id.
52. Id.
53. Id.
54. Id.
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Civil penalties up to $32,500 per violation or per day of violation;



Citizens’ civil actions to compel compliance with violations;



Criminal sanctions against organizations and individuals
for misrepresentation or knowing or negligent violation of
the statutes.55

Due to inflation adjustments, civil penalties in 2012 were increased
from $32,500 to $37,500 per violation or per day of violation.56 EPA has
great deference to decide whether to issue civil penalties, and the statutory language of many of the major environmental statutes provides
considerable amount of discretion regarding enforcement. 57 Normally,
the agency starts a continuing penalty from the first determination of a
violation and the final proof that the alleged violator is in compliance,
and then adjusts the penalty up or down, as it deems necessary.58
EPA pursues some enforcement actions vigorously while declining
to enforce others, letting other actions settle or choosing to drop actions
altogether. 59 If an alleged violator acts in bad faith, acts with
knowledge, or is a repeat offender, EPA is more likely to bring an enforcement action to ensure compliance.60 However, there are numerous
examples of EPA initiating an enforcement action against first-time offenders.61 When EPA decides to pursue an enforcement action against a
potential violator, it can do so internally or refer the case to the Department of Justice (the DOJ).62 However, if EPA decides to pursue the
action internally, the action is subject to EPA’s procedural rules, and the
prosecutor is likely to be more familiar with EPA.63 Therefore, EPA enjoys considerable benefits by pursuing the action internally.
Since Sackett v. EPA dealt specifically with an administrative
compliance order under the CWA, it is necessary to also set forth the
types of enforcement mechanisms under the CWA.
IV. ENFORCEMENT MECHANISMS UNDER THE CLEAN WATER
ACT

55. See CRAIG, supra note 32, at 20–29.
56. Sackett v. U.S. Env’t Prot. Agency, 132 S. Ct. 1367, 1370 n. 1 (2012) (“The Federal Civil Penalties Inflation Adjustment Act of 1990, 104 Stat. 890 . . . as amended by the
Debt Collection Improvement Act of 1996 . . . authorizes EPA to adjust the maximum penalt[ies] for inflation.”); 40 C.F.R. § 19.4 (2013).
57. See Barnett M. Lawrence, EPA’s Civil Penalty Policies: Making the Penalty Fit
the Violation, 22 ENVTL. L. REP. 10529, 10529 (1992), http://elr.info/newsanalysis/22/10529/epas-civil-penalty-policies-making-penalty-fit-violation.
58. BELL ET AL., supra note 25, at 94.
59. Id. at 95.
60. Id.
61. Id.
62. See id. at 96; see also Lawrence, supra note 57, at 10533–34.
63. BELL ET AL., supra note 25, at 96–97.
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Similarly, enforcement mechanisms under the CWA trace their
origin to the Refuse Act of 1899 and the FWCPA of 1948.64 Under the
Refuse Act of 1899, the Secretary of the Army permitted deposits of materials in navigable waters, so long as anchorage and navigation of vessels were not hindered as a result.65 The Corps had the administrative
task of issuing and monitoring the conduct that followed.66 Historically,
the Corps relied on “friendly persuasion” and recommended prosecution
only in cases of “flagrant violation.”67
[I]t has long been standing policy to secure compliance with . . .
provisions short of legal proceedings. Prosecution was recommended only in cases of willful or intentional violations. It was
the Corps’ established policy not to recommend prosecution
when the violation was “trivial, apparently unpremeditated, and
[resulted] in no material public injury” or when the violation
was “minor, unintentional, or accidental, and the party responsible [made] good the damages suffered.”68
Under the FWPCA, the Surgeon General of the Public Health Service and the Federal Works Administrator held responsibilities relating
to water pollution control.69 The Surgeon General would issue a formal
notification to the person(s) discharging a pollutant on the basis of reports, surveys, and studies. 70 The notification set forth recommended
remedial measures and specified a reasonable time for compliance.71 If
the recipient did not comply within the specified time, the Surgeon General would recommend the state where the discharge occurred initiate a
suit.72 If, within a reasonable time after the notification, the alleged violator did not comply, and if the state where the discharge occurred failed
to initiate a suit, the Federal Security Administrator would call a public
hearing where the board—made up of five or more persons appointed by
the Administrator—upon the presentation of evidence would make recommendations to the Administrator concerning the necessary actions
needed to secure compliance.73 After providing the alleged violator an
opportunity to comply with the board’s recommendations, the Federal
64.

Control

of

See generally Diane D. Eames, The Refuse Act of 1899: Its Scope and Role in
Water Pollution, 58 CALIF. L. REV. 1444 (1970), available at

http://scholarship.law.berkeley.edu/californialawreview/vol58/iss6/5/ (exploring “possible
modes of action and remedies available under” The Refuse Act of 1899).
65. 33 U.S.C. § 407 (2013).
66. Eames, supra note 64, at 1452.
67. Id. at 1453.
68. Id. at 1453 n.61 (alteration in original).
69. Federal Water Pollution Control Act of 1948, Pub. L. No. 80-845, § 1, 62 Stat.
1155, (1948).
70. Id. § 2(d)(2), 62 Stat. at 1156.
71. Id.
72. Id.
73. Id. § 2(d)(3), 62 Stat. at 1156–57.
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Security Administrator could then request the Attorney General initiate
a suit to bring the alleged violator into compliance. 74
Today, Section 1319 of the CWA governs the standards and enforcement mechanisms EPA may utilize.75 When EPA determines there
has been a violation of the CWA there are three main civil enforcement
options at its disposal: First, EPA may assess administrative penalties;
second, EPA may commence a civil action; lastly, EPA may issue an
administrative compliance order.76 Note, if EPA pursues either the first
or second option, the alleged violator is guaranteed notice and an opportunity to be heard prior to assessment of any penalties.77 Normally EPA
will choose to pursue an option that is appropriate for the violation and
the least resource consuming.78 Under all of the options, EPA must first
notify the recipient of the violation and whether EPA intends to bring
an enforcement action against such recipient.79
A. Administrative Penalties
As a civil enforcement option, EPA may assess administrative penalties under §1319(g)(1) of the CWA. 80 This section provides that
“[w]henever on the basis of any information available[,] the Administrator finds that any person has violated” specific sections of the CWA or
“the Secretary of the Army . . . finds that any person has violated any
permit condition or limitation” they may assess Class I or Class II civil
penalties.81 Class I penalties “may not exceed $10,000 per violation” and
may add up to a maximum amount of $32,500.82 As previously stated,
due to inflation, civil penalties in 2012 increased from $32,500 to
$37,500 per violation or per day of violation.83 Class II penalties “may
not exceed $10,000 per day for each day during which the violation continues” and up to a maximum amount of $125,000.84 EPA must give the
alleged violator written notice of the proposed penalty “and an opportunity to request, within thirty days[,]” a hearing in which the violator
will have “a reasonable opportunity to be heard and to present evidence”
prior to issuing a Class I penalty.85 Prior to assessing Class II penalties,
EPA must give the alleged violator notice and an opportunity for an ad74. Id. § 2(d)(4), 62 Stat. at 1157.
75. 33 U.S.C. § 1319 (2012).
76. Id. § 1319(a)(2)–(g).
77. Id. § 1319(g).
78. LYNN M. GALLAGHER, CLEAN WATER HANDBOOK 173–74 (3d ed. 2003).
79. 33 U.S.C. § 1319(a) (2001); BELL ET AL., supra note 25, at 371.
80. See 33 U.S.C. § 1319(g)(1) (2001).
81. Id. § 1319(g)(1).
82. Id. § 1319(g)(2)(A).
83. Sackett v. U.S. Env’t Prot. Agency, 132 S. Ct. 1367, 1370 n.1 (2012) (“The Federal Civil Penalties Inflation Adjustment Act of 1990, 104 Stat. 890 . . . as amended by the
Debt Collection Improvement Act of 1996 . . . authorizes the EPA to adjust [the] maximum
penalt[ies] [above] for inflation.”); see 40 C.F.R. § 19.4 (2012).
84. 33 U.S.C. § 1319(g)(2)(B) (2006).
85. 33 U.S.C. § 1319(g)(2)(A) (2006).
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judicatory hearing according to Section 554 of Title 5.86 In 2011, EPA
obtained $48 million from issued Class I and Class II administrative
penalties.87
Generally, upon the assessment of an administrative penalty, either Class I or Class II, the recipient is entitled to an “opportunity to be
heard and to present evidence.”88 Furthermore, the public is entitled to
comment, and any penalty assessed is subject to judicial review. 89 In
determining the amount of any administrative penalty assessed under
the CWA, EPA or the Secretary of the Army, at their discretion, may
take into consideration a number of equitable factors including: (1) the
seriousness of the violation, (2) the economic benefit to society resulting
from the violation, (3) the record of past CWA violations (4) good-faith
efforts to comply, (5) the violator’s ability to pay, and (6) other such matters surrounding the violation.90
B. Civil Enforcement Actions
As a second enforcement option, EPA may commence a civil enforcement action in District Court seeking civil penalties for CWA violations. Section 1319(b) provides that “the administrator is authorized to
commence a civil action for appropriate relief . . . for any violation for
which he is authorized to issue a compliance order under subsection (a)
of this section.”91 An alleged violator is afforded a jury trial, however,
the court holds the power in determining the appropriate penalty
amount.92 In calculating an appropriate penalty amount, EPA created
an equation, which includes a component of economic benefit, plus gravity of the violation, plus or minus adjustments.93 The gravity component
consists of four considerations: “(1) the significance of the violation, (2)
the actual or potential harm to human health or the environment, (3)
the number of violations, and (4) the duration of noncompliance.” 94 Adjustments are added or subtracted to the equation based on four circum86. Id.; 5 U.S.C. § 554 (2012) (stating the requirements for adjudications under the
Administrative Procedure Act).
87. Compliance and Enforcement Annual Results 2011 Fiscal Year, U.S. ENV’L.
PROT. AGENCY, http://www.epa.gov/compliance/resources/reports/endofyear/eoy2011/eoydata.html (last updated Dec. 8, 2011) [hereinafter Annual Results 2011 Fiscal Year] (stating
administrative penalties for 2011 as $47,880,973).
88. 33 U.S.C. § 1319(g)(4)(B) (2006); see also Sackett v. U.S. Env’t Prot. Agency, 622
F.3d 1139, 1142 (9th Cir. 2010), rev’d, 132 S.Ct. 1367 (2012) (holding that a violator is entitled to the “opportunity to be heard and to present evidence”)(citation omitted).”).
89. 33 U.S.C. § 1319(g)(4)(A), (g)(8) (2006).
90. 33 U.S.C. § 1319(g)(3) (2006); see also Sackett, 622 F.3d at 1142; Frank B.
Cross, Administrative Orders and Penalties, 2 FED. ENVT’L REG. OF REAL ESTATE § 5.29
(2013).
91. 33 U.S.C. § 1319(b) (2006).
92. See GALLAGHER, supra note 78, at 177–78.
93. See BELL ET AL., supra note 25, at 378–79.
94. Id. at 378.
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stances: (1) a history of non-cooperation, (2) ability to pay, (3) litigation
considerations, and (4) other considerations. 95 “It is EPA’s policy that
penalties should recover the full” amount “of noncompliance, calculated
from the beginning of noncompliance until” the alleged violator is in
compliance.96
C. Administrative Compliance Orders
EPA may issue an administrative compliance order as a third civil
enforcement option. Section 1319(a) provides:
Whenever, on the basis of any information available to him, the
Administrator finds that any person is in violation of any condition or limitation which implements [various sections of the
CWA] . . . he shall notify the person in alleged violation . . . if
beyond the thirtieth day after the Administrator’s notification . .
. the Administrator shall issue an order requiring such person to
comply with such condition . . .97
EPA officials assert that administrative compliance orders are the
beginning of the conversation between EPA and an alleged violator.98
EPA has issued administrative compliance orders “to individuals and
industry—both large and small.” 99 At its core, administrative compliance orders are issued to those whom EPA believes are in violation of
the CWA.100 The orders set forth the nature of the violation, specify a
date by which the individual must comply with applicable law 101 and
often include a compliance schedule and interval assignments that must
be completed while taking the necessary steps to compliance.102 “There
is no hearing or other adjudication” prior to the issuance of an administrative compliance order, nor may a recipient obtain an agency hearing
afterwards.103 After an administrative compliance order has been issued
and EPA has determined a violation has occurred, EPA will impose ad95.
96.
97.
98.

Id. at 379.

GALLAGHER, supra note 78, at 178.
33 U.S.C. § 1319(a) (2006).
Megan Anderson, EPA Enforcement After Sackett v. EPA: The Future of EPA
Compliance Orders, MICH. J. OF ENVTL. & ADMIN. L. (Apr. 5, 2012), available at
http://students.law.umich.edu/mjeal/2012/04/epa-enforcement-after-sackett-v-epa-the-futureof-epa-compliance-orders/.
99. Rothschild, supra note 48, at 47.
100. Id.
101. Id.; see also Sackett v. U.S. Env’t Prot. Agency, 622 F.3d 1139, 1142 (9th Cir.
2010), rev’d, 132 S.Ct. 1367 (2012) (quoting S. Pines Assocs. by Goldmeier v. United States,
912 F.2d 713, 715 (4th Cir. 1990)).
102. See GALLAGHER, supra note 78, at 175; see also BELL ET AL., supra note 25, at
377.
103. Jonathan H. Adler, Wetlands, Property Rights, and the Due Process Deficit in
Environmental Law, CATO SUP. CT. REV. 139, 149 (2012), available at
http://www.cato.org/sites/cato.org/files/serials/files/supreme-court-review/2012/9/scr-2012adler.pdf (discussing the Sackett v. U.S. Env’t Prot. Agency case, federal regulations of wetlands, and CWA enforcement).
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ministrative penalties according to the process as described in Part IV-A
of this article. The agency believes “administrative compliance orders
are . . . commands”; they are not judgments and do not impose sanctions
for violating the CWA or violating the compliance order itself. 104 However, some EPA officials and agents believe that administrative compliance orders are only warnings. 105 Failing to comply with an administrative compliance order could create the basis for a knowing violation in a
criminal case or a claim of bad faith in a civil action. 106 Administrative
compliance orders allow EPA to respond quickly to ongoing violations of
major environmental laws without becoming immediately entangled in
litigation.107 A Senate report from 1972 stated:
One purpose of these new requirements [for administrative
compliance orders] is to avoid the necessity of lengthy fact finding, investigations, and negotiations at the time of enforcement.
Enforcement of violations of requirements under this Act should
be based on relatively narrow fact situations requiring a minimum of discretionary decision making or delay.108
EPA issues administrative compliance orders mostly because “the
agency can issue them based ‘on any information’ available to it.” 109
Thus, EPA can require a party to comply “based on information that
[may] not be sufficient to meet . . . judicial standards” required to prosecute a violation of the CWA. 110 Out of all of the enforcement options at
EPA’s disposal, administrative compliance orders are EPA’s primary
enforcement option.111 As the table below indicates, in 2011 EPA issued
a total of 1,324 administrative compliance orders under all major environmental statutes.112
Fiscal Year 2011
Enforcement & Compliance Assurance Accomplishments
Civil Enforcement and Compliance Activities113
104.

See GALLAGHER, supra note 78, at 176; see also BELL ET AL., supra note 25, at

377.

105. Timothy Sandefur, Compliance–or Else: The EPA’s Compliance Order Regime
Creates a Hobson’s Choice, 34 REG. 8, 10 n.4 (Winter 2011-2012), available at
http://www.cato.org/pubs/regulation/regv34n4/v34n4-2.pdf.
106. See GALLAGHER, supra note 78, at 176.
107. Sam Wheeler, Ninth Circuit: EPA Compliance Orders Are Not Subject to PreEnforcement Judicial Review, 38 ECOLOGY L.Q. 611, 611–12 (2011) (discussing what administrative compliance orders are and the Ninth Circuit Court of Appeals decision in Sackett v.
U.S. Env’t Prot. Agency, 622 F.3d 1139 (9th Cir. 2010)).
108. S. Rep. No. 92-414, at 3730 (1972).
109. Rothschild, supra note 48, at 47.
110. Id.
111. See Annual Results 2011 Fiscal Year, supra note 87 (comparing administrative
compliance orders with other civil enforcement actions such as civil judicial complaints).
112. Id.
113. Id.
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Referrals of Civil Judicial Enforcement Cases to Department of
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Supplemental Referrals of Civil Judicial Enforcement Cases to
DOJ
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199
33

Civil Judicial Complaints Filed with Court

148

Civil Judicial Enforcement Case Conclusions

182

Administrative Penalty Order Complaints

1,760

Final Administrative Penalty Orders

1,735

Administrative Compliance Orders

1,324

Cases with Supplemental Environmental Projects

103

Inspections/Evaluations

19,000

Civil Investigations

177

Compliance Assistance Center User Sessions

3,500,000

Furthermore, in the same year EPA issued 1,760 administrative
penalty order complaints and 1,735 administrative penalty orders. 114 As
previously discussed, administrative penalty orders (aka administrative
penalties) are issued after an administrative compliance order or a civil
action is brought and a violation is deemed to have occurred.115 Thus,
although the data indicates a greater number of administrative penalties were issued over administrative compliance orders, when fully understood, administrative compliance orders in 2011 outnumbered administrative penalties.116 Moreover, a comparison between administrative compliance orders and civil judicial complaints filed with the court
and civil judicial enforcement case conclusions again indicate that administrative compliance orders are used more often than any other enforcement mechanism.117 Specifically, EPA issued 148 civil judicial complaints filed with the court and 182 civil judicial enforcement case conclusions in 2011.118 Both of these combined totals do not outnumber administrative compliance orders.119
Of the 1,324 issued compliance orders in 2011, EPA issued 479 administrative compliance orders under the CWA.120 Of those 479 admin114.
115.
116.
117.
118.

Id.

GALLAGHER, supra note 78, at 175–76.

Annual Results 2011 Fiscal Year, supra note 87.
Id.
Id.
119
Id.
120. Carolyn L. McIntoch, Sackett: A Victory, But Not a Solution: Supreme Court
Rules on Important Clean Water Act Case, COAL AGE MAG. 80 (April 2012), available at
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istrative compliance orders issued pursuant to the CWA, EPA issued
370 administrative compliance orders pursuant to the CWA-NPDES,121
the National Pollutant Discharge Elimination System that “controls water pollution by regulating point sources that discharge pollutants into
waters of the United States.”122 However, EPA issued only twelve administrative compliance orders under the CWA-311,123 the Oil Spill Prevention Compliance Monitoring section that “regulates oil storage.”124
Comparing these numbers among the CWA sections, it is clear that the
greatest number of administrative compliance orders have been issued
under the NPDES section of the CWA. 125 This determination does not
subtract from the belief that administrative compliance orders are
EPA’s most used enforcement mechanism, but adds to it.126

http://www.pattonboggs.com/files/News/d84685bd-cb16-41eb-bc127c9cbf852d8c/Presentation/NewsAttachment/3d3b7ce9-70c0-4253-b4ce7e8c0115cf8d/CA_April_LEGAL.pdf; see, e.g., U.S. ENV’L. PROT. AGENCY, NATIONAL
ENFORCEMENT
TRENDS
REPORT
6
(June
2012),
available
at
http://www.epa.gov/compliance/resources/reports/nets/nets-e4-acos.pdf [hereinafter EPA]
(National Enforcement Trends graph showing the number of EPA administrative compliance
orders from 1994 to 2011 for all major environmental statutes governed by EPA) .
121. National Enforcement Trends: FY 1994 – FY 2011 Administrative Compliance
Orders, U.S. ENV’L. PROT. AGENCY (2011).
122. National Pollutant Discharge Elimination System, U.S. ENV’L. PROT. AGENCY,
http://cfpub.epa.gov/npdes/index.cfm (last updated Mar. 12, 2009, 11:32 PM).
123. Id.
124. Oil Spill Prevention Compliance Monitoring, U.S. ENV’L. PROT. AGENCY,
http://www.epa.gov/compliance/monitoring/programs/cwa/oilspill.html (last updated June 13,
2012).
125. Id.
126. Id.
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Fiscal Year 2001-2011 EPA Administrative Compliance Orders127
Statute

01

02

03

04

05

06

07

08

09

10

11

CAA

192

144

197

198

187

166

135

156

152

109

154

CERCL

217

194

206

189

164

224

235

155

346

119

144

367

490

558

678

749

414

361

367

392

420

370

12

11

10

7

17

8

17

13

6

14

12

66

45

87

90

77

81

54

59

85

98

97

EPCRA

1

0

0

0

0

0

0

0

0

0

0

FIFRA

12

12

38

93

55

162

62

71

71

98

83

MPRSA

NR

NR

0

0

0

0

0

0

0

0

0

RCRA

30

34

31

28

28

20

26

25

24

30

37

SDWA-

542

283

419

478

609

308

278

482

495

393

402

35

36

33

43

42

51

68

57

16

14

19

TSCA

0

1

2

0

0

0

1

1

0

1

0

Multi-

1

0

1

3

8

4

10

4

1

6

6

1,476

1,250

1,807

1,936

1,936

1,438

1,247

1,390

1,588

1,302

1,324

A

CWANPDES
CWA311
CWA404

PWSS
SDWAUIC

Program

Total

Thus, it appears that administrative compliance orders are EPA’s
preferred enforcement tool due to the comparison between other enforcement mechanisms, the sheer number of orders issued, and the understanding that EPA may issue the orders based on any information
made available to it.128
Additionally, EPA and the Corps have evolved in their efforts to
abate and control water pollution. In retrospect, a comparison of how
the Corps and Surgeon General enforced violations of the Refuse Act of
1899 and violations of the FWPCA of 1948 with how the Corps and EPA
enforce violations and ensure compliance today, illustrates EPA has
moved away from friendly persuasion towards more aggressive enforcement tactics.129 In the past, the federal government may have been more
forgiving when it came to water pollution since the ramifications of pol127.
128.
129.

Id.
Id.
Compare Eames, supra note 64, at 1470, with EPA, supra note 123, at 6.
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lution were not fully understood. Additionally, the federal government
was fairly new at enforcing water pollution; the Refuse Act of 1899 was
only recently created.130 Also it appears that before the creation of EPA,
the federal government was more eager to hold public hearings prior to
initiating suits.131
However, today as EPA has grown and its powers have increased,
cases like Sackett v. EPA give the impression that EPA no longer has
the time nor wants to hold public hearings prior to initiating a suit.132
This indicates that EPA officials have forgotten the original intentions
behind the agency’s foundation. As the years have passed and the ramifications of pollution have been clarified, we can see that EPA and the
Corps have cracked down on enforcement.133 No longer do EPA and the
Corps consider violations to be trivial, unpremeditated, minor, unintentional, or accidental, as many times enforcement actions are taken
against parties big and small.134 The millions of dollars collected in administrative penalties each year and the hundreds of administrative
compliance orders issued to recipients in every region of the United
States strongly indicate a large shift from preventing only flagrant violations to preventing any violation irrespective of whether it is minor or
willful.135
In light of the background provided on the CWA’s enforcement
tools, it is necessary to set forth the U.S. Supreme Court’s decision in
Sackett v. EPA in order to understand where EPA’s enforcement tools
stand today and where they need to be in order to pass muster.
V. THE SACKETT V. EPA DECISION
On March 21, 2012 a unanimous U.S. Supreme Court handed down
a long-awaited decision holding that property owners and regulated entities may bring suit challenging EPA compliance orders under the
APA.136 Prior to the decision, EPA opined that administrative compliance order recipients could not challenge EPA’s jurisdiction arguing that
recipients had to either comply with the order or wait for EPA to bring a
civil suit, and only then could they seek judicial review. 137 Many recipients who chose to challenge EPA’s administrative compliance orders
were often assessed extensive monetary penalties for each day they
failed to comply.138 The Supreme Court’s decision has sparked a nationwide discussion among scholars and practitioners about the future of
130.
131.
132.
133.
134.
135.
136.
137.
138.

See Eames, supra note 64.
See id. at 1456.
See Wheeler, supra note 107, at 612.
See EPA, supra note 123, at 6.
See id.
See id.
Sackett v. U.S. Env’t Prot. Agency, 132 S. Ct. 1367, 1374 (2012).
Id. at 1340.

Id.
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EPA’s use of administrative compliance orders.139 Many wonder if EPA
will change its procedures to allow a more thorough examination of the
law before issuing an administrative compliance order or if EPA will
continue its current practices. 140 It will be important to see how EPA
responds to this decision over time because the decision affects both
those at the top—EPA—and those at the bottom—the everyday property
owner. 141
A. Facts & Procedural History
In 2005, Michael and Chantell Sackett, owners of a small construction company, purchased 0.63 acres within an existing residential subdivision in Bonner County, Idaho, just north of Priest Lake.142 Several
other lots, some containing permanent structures, separated their lot
from the lake. 143 After obtaining the necessary local building permits
nearly two years later, the Sacketts’ employees began work on the construction of their three-bedroom, single-level, family home.144 In April
and May of 2007, while in the process of building their home, the Sacketts filled part of their lot with fill materials—soil and rock.145 A few
days into the construction of their home, EPA and Corps agents came
onto the Sacketts’ property and verbally ordered their employees to stop
working.146 After EPA’s visit, “the Sacketts contacted their local Corps
office…for an after-the-fact wetlands fill-permit.” 147 However, the Sacketts declined to submit the application because it required them to concede that their property contained wetlands.” 148 During that summer
and fall of 2007, the Sacketts contacted EPA several times to inquire as
to why EPA officials stopped the Sacketts’ homebuilding. 149 However,
EPA did not issue a response.150

139. See Turner Smith & Margaret Holden, Case Comment, Sackett v. EPA, 37
HARV. ENVTL. L. REV. 301 (2013).
140. See David Weinstein et al., Bolstering the Presumption of APA Reviewability:

The Supreme Court Subjects CWA Compliance Orders, and Potentially Other Agency Actions, to Immediate Judicial Review, 13 NO. 2 ABA ENVTL. ENFORCEMENT & CRIMES COMM.
NEWSL. 6, 6–8 (2012).
141. See Sackett, 132 S. Ct. at 1370.
142. Greg Stohr, Supreme Court, Mike and Chantell Sackett vs. the EPA,
BLOOMBERG
BUSINESSWEEK
MAGAZINE
(Aug.
11,
2011),
http://www.businessweek.com/magazine/mike-and-chantell-sackett-vs-the-epa08112011.html.
143. Sackett v. U.S. Env’t Prot. Agency, 132 S. Ct. 1367, 1370 (2012).
144. Damien M. Schiff, Sackett v. EPA: Compliance Orders and The Right of Judicial Review, CATO SUPREME COURT REVIEW 113, 114 (Ilyia Shapiro et al. eds., 2012).
145. Sackett, 132 S. Ct. at 1370.
146. Schiff, supra note 144, at 114.
147. Id.
148. Id.
149. Id.
150. See id.
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In November 2007, EPA issued the Sacketts an administrative
compliance order under the CWA. 151 EPA’s administrative compliance
order stated that the Sacketts’ lot contained wetlands subject to federal
jurisdiction, which the Sacketts had unlawfully filled without a permit.152 Specifically, the administrative compliance order concluded: (1)
the Sacketts’ property “contained wetlands within the meaning of 33
C.F.R. § 328.4,” (2) the property’s wetlands were adjacent to Priest
Lake, which is “a navigable water,” (3) the Sacketts “discharged fill material into wetlands” at their property, (4) “[b]y causing such fill material to enter waters of the United States, the Sacketts have engaged, and
are continuing to engage, in the discharge of pollutants,” and (5) the
Sacketts violated the CWA by discharging fill materials into the waters
of the United States without a permit. 153 EPA’s compliance order directed the Sacketts to immediately restore their property in accordance
with EPA’s Restoration Work Plan, which included restoring the property to its “pre-disturbance vegetative condition” and providing EPA employees access to the Sackett property and all records and documentation relating to the property. 154 If the Sacketts failed to restore their
property as set forth under the administrative compliance order they
would be fined $37,500 per day. 155
Under the CWA, courts have generally held that every day a wetland remains filled without a permit is a day a violation is accrued.156
The statute of limitations under CWA regarding wetlands is five
years.157 Accordingly, one act of filling a wetland without a permit, in
theory, could result in a maximum penalty of $68,475,000 before EPA
filed a suit.158
The Sacketts requested a hearing with EPA officials, arguing that
their property was not subject to EPA control. Their request was denied.159 Upon the denial of their request, the Sacketts were limited to
three choices: (1) comply with the administrative compliance order, (2)
refuse to comply, while waiting for EPA to bring a civil action to enforce
the administrative compliance order and thus their compliance, all the
while risking the imposition of incurring up to $37,500 per day in civil
administrative penalties, or (3) file suit in district court under the
APA.160 The Sacketts thus faced a devastating choice: obey the administrative compliance order and restore their residential lot, which would
151. Id. at 114–15.
152. Sackett v. U.S. Env’t Prot. Agency, 132 S. Ct. 1367, 1370–71 (2012).
153. Id. at 1371.
154. Schiff, supra note 144, at 115.
155. Id. at 130.
156. Sackett , 132 S. Ct. at 1370.
157. Rothschild, supra note 48, at 48.
158. Id.
159. Sackett v. U.S. Env’t Prot. Agency, 132 S. Ct. 1367, 1371 (2012).
160. Weinstein et al., supra note 140, at 8 (discussing Sackett v. U.S. E.P.A. and its
implications).
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cost them thousands of dollars, or ignore the order and take their chances with EPA 161 Furthermore, ignoring the administrative compliance
order could be viewed as proof of knowingly violating the CWA and thus
enhance any civil penalties they could be hit with later.162
The Sacketts chose to bring suit in the United States District Court
for the District of Idaho, requesting declaratory and injunctive relief. 163
The Sacketts contended the wetlands were not subject to EPA jurisdiction, and argued that EPA’s issuance of the administrative compliance
order was “arbitrary and capricious” under the APA because it deprived
them of “life, liberty, or property, without due process of law,” a violation of the Fifth Amendment.164 EPA moved to dismiss on the grounds
that an administrative compliance order was not subject to judicial review.165 The District Court agreed and dismissed the Sacketts’ claim for
want of subject matter jurisdiction reasoning that an administrative
compliance order was not “final” agency action subject to judicial review
under APA and that CWA precludes pre-enforcement judicial review of
administrative compliance orders. 166 The District Court’s opinion followed the significant amount of case law holding the same. 167 The Sacketts appealed and the Ninth Circuit affirmed, holding that the CWA
prohibited pre-enforcement review of administrative compliance orders
under APA.168 The Ninth Circuit determined that based on the CWA’s
structure and legislative history, Congress did not intend compliance
orders to be judicially reviewable.169 It held that an administrative compliance order was really only a warning notice that lacked the kind of
legal force that gives rise to due process concerns. 170 Furthermore, the
Ninth Circuit “credited the government’s contention that judicial review
of compliance orders would frustrate Congress’s enforcement options
and would hamper the agency’s effective administration of the Act.”171
The result reached by the Ninth Circuit was in line with the consensus
of several other sister circuits.172 Following the Ninth Circuit’s decision,
the U.S. Supreme Court granted certiorari.173
161. See id.
162. See id.
163. Sackett v. U.S. Env’t Prot. Agency, 132 S. Ct. 1367, 1371 (2012).
164. Id.; see also Rothschild, supra note 48.
165. Sackett, 132 S. Ct. at 1371.
166. See id.
167. Sackett v. U.S. Env’t Prot. Agency, 622 F.3d 1139, 1141 (9th Cir. 2009), rev’d,
132 S. Ct. 1367 (2012).
168. Id. at 1139.
169. Id. at 1142–44.
170. Id. at 1145–46.
171. Schiff, supra note 144, at 120.
172. Wheeler, supra note 107 at 617 (discussing the Ninth Circuit Court of Appeals
decision in Sackett v. U.S. Env’t Prot. Agency, 622 F.3d 1139 (9th Cir. 2010), the circuit split
between the Eleventh Circuit and the Fourth, Sixth, Seventh, Tenth and Ninth Circuits, and
the author’s agreement with the Ninth Circuit, believing it was correct to hold that administrative compliance orders should not be subject to judicial review).
173. Sackett v. U.S. Env’t Prot. Agency, 132 S. Ct. 1367, 1367 (2012)
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B. Circuit Split Prior to Supreme Court’s Decision in Sackett v. EPA
The Sacketts’ case was very similar to a 2003 Eleventh Circuit
case, Tennessee Valley Authority v. Whitman, (TVA v. Whitman), in
which the court held that EPA could not impose penalties for a violation
of an administrative compliance order under the Clean Air Act (CAA)
because the order itself did not constitute “final” agency action and was
not judicially reviewable as its enforcement would violate due process.174
As previously mentioned, the CWA was modeled after the CAA; the two
acts have very similar enforcement tools.175 EPA issued an administrative compliance order concluding that the Tennessee Valley Authority
(TVA) violated the CAA when it undertook rehabilitation projects at
nine power plants without permits. 176 The administrative compliance
order required that TVA take costly, burdensome actions to comply.177
EPA delegated to the Environmental Appeals Board (EAB) the task of
informally adjudicating whether TVA was liable by reconsidering the
administrative compliance order.178 The EAB decided that TVA did violate the CAA when it acted without a proper permit.179 The TVA filed a
petition for review with the Eleventh Circuit requesting that asking it
set aside the EAB order.180 The Eleventh Circuit ultimately held that
“because an [administrative compliance order] can be issued ‘on the basis of any information available’ to the Administrator, and because noncompliance with an [administrative compliance order] automatically
triggers civil and criminal penalties . . . . The EPA is the ultimate arbiter of guilt or innocence . . . [and] this [CAA] scheme violates the Due
Process Clause and the separation-of-powers principle.”181
However, other circuits rejected the theory in TVA v. Whitman,182
and many district courts followed suit.183 In 1995, the Tenth Circuit held

174. Tenn. Valley Auth. v. Whitman, 336 F.3d 1236, 1239 (11th Cir. 2003).
175. Sackett v. U.S. Env’t Prot. Agency, 622 F.3d 1139, 1141 (9th Cir. 2009) (citing
Laguna Gatuna, Inc. v. Browner, 58 F.3d 564, 565 (10th Cir. 1995)); see also S. Pines Assocs.
ex rel. Goldmeier v. U.S., 912 F.2d 713, 716 (4th Cir. 1990) (citing S. Rep. No. 92-414, 92d
Cong., 1st Sess. 63 (1971), reprinted in 1972 U.S. Code Cong. & Admin. News pp. 3668,
3730).
176. Tenn. Valley Auth., 336 F.3d at 1239.
177. Id.
178. Id.
179. Id.
180. Id.
181. Id. at 1243.
182. See, e.g., Laguna Gatuna, Inc. v. Browner, 58 F.3d 564, 564 (10th Cir. 1995); S.
Ohio Coal Co. v. Office of Surface Mining, Reclamation & Enforcement, 20 F.3d 1418, 1418
(6th Cir. 1994); S. Pines Assocs. ex rel. Goldmeier v. U.S., 912 F.2d 713, 713 (4th Cir. 1990);
Hoffman Grp., Inc. v. Env’t Prot. Agency, 902 F.2d 567, 567 (7th Cir. 1990); but see Tenn.
Valley Auth. v. Whitman, 336 F.3d 1236, 1236 (11th Cir. 2003).
183. See, e.g., Sharp Land Co. v. U.S., 956 F. Supp. 691, 693–94 (M.D. La. 1996);
Child v. U.S., 851 F. Supp. 1527, 1533 (D. Utah 1994); Bd. of Managers, Bottineau Cnty.
Water Res. Dist. v. Bornhoft, 812 F. Supp. 1012, 1014–15 (D. N.D. 1993); McGown v. U.S.,

86

IDAHO LAW REVIEW

[VOL. 50

that administrative compliance orders did not give a party a right to a
judicial hearing reasoning that it would undermine EPA’s regulatory
authority.184 Both the Fourth and Seventh Circuits concluded that Congress intended to preclude judicial review of administrative compliance
orders prior to the commencement of enforcement proceedings because
“the structure of these environmental statutes indicate[d] that Congress
intended to allow EPA to act to address environmental problems quickly
and without becoming immediately entangled in litigation.” 185 The Seventh Circuit believed that:
In drafting the Clean Water Act, Congress chose to make assessed administrative penalties subject to review while at the
same time it chose not to make a compliance order judicially reviewable unless the EPA decides to bring a civil suit to enforce it
. . . . Having provided a detailed mechanism for judicial consideration of a compliance order via an enforcement proceeding,
Congress has impliedly precluded judicial review of a compliance
order except in an enforcement proceeding.186
In 1994, the Sixth Circuit joined the Fourth and Seventh Circuits
holding that district courts are without jurisdiction to review preenforcement orders issued under the CWA. 187 Furthermore, as previously mentioned, in 2010 the Ninth Circuit joined the Tenth, Fourth, Seventh, and Sixth Circuits holding that Congress did not intend for the
judicial review of administrative compliance orders. 188
C. Pre-Enforcement Review
To understand the Ninth Circuit’s decision in dismissing the Sackett case it is necessary to understand what constitutes pre-enforcement
review and why pre-enforcement review was created. Pre-enforcement
review can trace its’ origin to two conflicting but very important public
policy objectives: (1) due process and (2) the prompt and efficient administration of justice.189 The Fifth Amendment provides that “No person
shall be deprived . . . of life, liberty, or property, without due process of
law.”190 Under the Fifth Amendment there is a common understanding
that “prior to the government’s taking away an individual’s liberty or
property, he or she has a right to be heard by a neutral third party em747 F. Supp. 539, 542 (E.D. Mo. 1990); Fiscella & Fiscella v. U.S., 717 F. Supp. 1143, 1146–
47 (E.D. Va. 1989).
184. Laguna Gatuna, Inc., 58 F.3d at 565.
185. S. Pines Assocs., 912 F.2d at 716; Hoffman Grp., Inc., 902 F.2d at 569; see also
S. Ohio Coal Co., 20 F.3d at 1426.
186. Hoffman Grp., Inc., 902 F.2d at 569.
187. S. Ohio Coal Co., 20 F.3d at 1427.
188. Sackett v. U.S. Env’t Prot. Agency, 622 F.3d 1139, 1142–44. (9th Cir. 2009),
rev’d, 132 S. Ct. 1367 (2012).
189. Rothschild, supra note 48, at 48.
190. U.S. CONST. amend. V.
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powered to decide whether the taking is justified under the law and the
facts.”191 On the other hand, parties expect the administration of justice
to be prompt. To ensure justice is swift, not every decision at every level
can be challenged.
Concerned with due process, a number of statutes include private
rights of action indicating when an action can be challenged. 192 For
those statutes that do not provide such rights, Congress provided for
review of administrative actions under the APA. 193 Section 706 of the
APA provides that “the reviewing court shall . . . hold unlawful and set
aside agency action, findings, and conclusions found to be . . . arbitrary,
capricious, an abuse of discretion, or otherwise not in accordance with
law.”194 However, in light of expediency concerns, the APA restricts review to “final” agency actions.195 “Final” agency action is judicially reviewable under the APA when the action: (1) “mark[s] the ‘consummation’ of the agency’s decision making process,” 196 and (2) “[is] one by
which ‘rights or obligations have been determined,’ or from which ‘legal
consequences will flow.’”197 Conversely, agency action is not reviewable
under the APA if the relevant statute “preclude[s] judicial review.”198
Therefore in practice, there is a presumption of judicial review under
the APA unless there is clear and convincing evidence to the contrary. 199
Thus, the Supreme Court in Sackett was left to employ this in coming to
its conclusion.
D. Supreme Court Decision
The Sackett Court considered two issues in reaching its holding: (1)
whether the administrative compliance order was final agency action;200
and (2) whether the CWA’s statutory scheme precluded APA review. 201
The Court swiftly dismissed the first issue holding that there was no
doubt the administrative compliance order was agency action, and that
the administrative compliance order had all the “hallmarks of APA fi-

191. Rothschild, supra note 48, at 49.
192. Id. at 48.
193. Presumption of Judicial Review Unless Precluded, 2 FED. PROC., L. ED. § 2.282
(2012).
194. 5 U.S.C. § 706(2)(A) (2012).
195. 5 U.S.C. § 704 (2012).
196. Bennett v. Spear, 520 U.S. 154, 178 (1997) (quoting Chi. & S. Air Lines, Inc. v.
Waterman S.S. Corp. 333 U.S. 103, 113 (1948)).
197. Id. (quoting Bos. Marine Terminal Ass’n v. Rederiaktiebolaget Transatlantic,
400 U.S. 62, 71 (1970)).
198. 5 U.S.C. § 701(a)(1) (2012); Sackett v. U.S. Env’t Prot. Agency, 622 F.3d 1139,
1142 (9th Cir. 2009).
199. Rothschild, supra note 48, at 48.
200. Sackett v. U.S. Env’t Prot. Agency, 132 S. Ct. 1367, 1371 (2012).
201. Id. at 1372–73.
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nality” because EPA determined the Sacketts’ obligations through the
compliance order.202
First, the administrative compliance order articulated that the
Sacketts have a legal obligation to restore their property according to
the EPA’s Restoration Work Plan, and provide the EPA agents access to
the Sacketts’ property and to all relevant property documents. 203 Second, the administrative compliance order stated that legal consequences
flow from the issuance of the order.204 Specifically, the administrative
compliance order exposed the Sacketts to double civil penalties in future
enforcement proceedings and severely limited their ability to obtain a
permit from the Corps for fill materials. 205 Furthermore, the Court determined that the issuance of the administrative compliance order
marked the “consummation” of EPA’s decision making process because,
as the Sacketts learned when their hearing with the EPA was denied,
the “Findings and Conclusions” within the administrative compliance
order were not subject to further agency review.206 Additionally, EPA’s
invitation to the Sacketts to engage in “informal discussion of the terms
and requirements” and to inform the EPA of any allegations which the
Sacketts believed were inaccurate, did not present a claim for further
agency review.207 The possibility that EPA might reconsider the order
during an informal discussion did “not suffice to make an otherwise final agency action nonfinal.”208
Finally, the APA requires that the person seeking APA review of
final agency action have “no other adequate remedy in a court.” 209
There were only two possible paths the Sacketts could take to obtain
judicial review of the administrative compliance order: (1) wait for the
EPA to bring a civil action against them or (2) apply for a permit from
the Corps and then file suit under the APA if the permit was denied. 210
Since the Sacketts could not take action as just described, the Court
concluded they had no other remedy in court. 211 Generally, in CWA enforcement cases, judicial review begins via a civil action brought by the
EPA under 33 U.S.C. § 1319.212 However, alleged violators such as the
Sacketts could not initiate a civil action against the EPA; every day they
202. Id. at 1371 (“We consider first whether the compliance order is final agency action. There is no doubt it is agency action, which the APA defines as including even a ‘failure
to act.’ §§ 551(13), 701(b)(2). But is it final? It has all of the hallmarks of APA finality that
our opinions establish. Through the order, the EPA, ‘determined’ ‘rights or obligations.’”). Id.
203. Id. at 1371.
204. Id.; see also Bennett v. Spear, 520 U.S. 154, 178 (1997) (quoting Bos. Marine
Terminal Ass’n v. Rederiaktiebolaget Transatlantic, 400 U.S. 62, 71 (1970)).
205. Sackett v. U.S. Env’t Prot. Agency, 132 S. Ct. 1367, 1372 (2012).
206. Id.
207. Id.
208. Id.
209. Id.; see also 5 U.S.C. § 704 (2012) (The Administrative Procedure Act is limited
to agency actions “for which there is no other adequate remedy in a court.”).
210. Sackett, 132 S. Ct. 1367 at 1372.
211. Id. at 1372–74.
212. Id. at 1369.
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waited for the EPA to bring suit against them they accrued an additional $75,000 (“$37,500 for violating the Act and another $37,500 for violating the compliance order”)213 in potential liability.214 Justice Alito in his
concurrence stated, “in a nation that values due process, not to mention
private property, such treatment is unthinkable.” 215 Furthermore, the
Court went on to state that “the remedy for denial of action that might
be sought from one agency does not ordinarily provide an ‘adequate
remedy’ for action already taken by another agency.” 216 Thus, determining that suit brought under the APA, after a Corps’ permit is denied
does not provide an “adequate remedy” for an action taken by EPA.
Regarding the second issue, the Court concluded that the CWA’s
statutory scheme did not preclude APA review because nothing in the
CWA expressly precluded judicial review under the APA. 217 APA’s presumption favoring judicial review may be overcome by interpreting the
intent of the entire statute’s scheme.218
The Government set forth four arguments attempting to explain
why the statutory scheme of the CWA precludes review.219 First, “because Congress gave the EPA the choice between a judicial proceeding
and an administrative [compliance order], it would undermine the Act to
allow judicial review of [an order].”220 The Government further argued
that an administrative compliance order provided a way of notifying recipients of alleged violations and “quickly resolving issues through voluntary compliance.”221 However, the Court disagreed, holding that judicial review is consistent with this function of notification and speedy
resolution even when a recipient does not choose voluntary compliance,
and that the CWA does not guarantee the EPA that an administrative
compliance order is always the most effective tool.222
Second, the Government argued that administrative “compliance
orders are not self-executing,” rather, they “must be enforced by the
agency in a . . . judicial action,” which suggested that Congress viewed
an order “as a step in the deliberative process” rather than a sanction
subject to judicial review.223 Again the Court disagreed, holding that the
issuance of the compliance order was not just “a step in the deliberative
process” because when the EPA denied the Sacketts’ hearing, the next

213.
214.
215.
216.
217.
218.
219.
220.
221.
222.
223.

Id. at 1375 (Alito, J., concurring).
Id. at 1372.
Id. at 1375 (Alito, J., concurring).
Sackett, 132 S. Ct. at 1372.
Id. at 1372–74.
Id. at 1373.
Id.
Id.
Id.
Sackett, 132 S. Ct. at 1373.
Id.
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step in the process was to either comply with the EPA’s order or face a
judicial action.224
Third, the Government argued that Congress did not expressly
provide for judicial review of compliance orders. 225 This third argument
was also dismissed because the Court reasoned that the cases the EPA
relied upon were not analogous, and there was no suggestion that Congress sought to “exclude compliance-order recipients from the Act’s review scheme.” 226 Finally, the Government warned the Court that the
EPA would be less inclined to use administrative compliance orders if
they were subject to judicial review.227 The Court disagreed with this
argument as well holding that if the EPA would be less inclined to issue
administrative compliance orders then such belief is “true for all agency
actions subject[ ] to judicial review.”228 The Court further stated:
[T]here is no reason to think that the Clean Water Act was
uniquely designed to enable the strong-arming of regulated parties into ‘voluntary compliance’ without the opportunity for judicial review—even judicial review of the question whether the
regulated party is within the EPA’s jurisdiction. Compliance orders will remain an effective means of securing prompt voluntary compliance in those many cases where there is no substantial basis to question their validity. 229
The Court concluded that the issued administrative compliance order was final agency action and the CWA does not preclude judicial review.230 Thus, the Sacketts were allowed to bring suit to challenge the
EPA’s administrative compliance order under the APA. 231 The Ninth
Circuit was reversed, resolving the circuit split between the Eleventh
Circuit and the Fourth, Sixth, Seventh, and Tenth Circuits.232 The case
was remanded for further proceedings consistent with the Supreme
Court’s opinion.233
VI. THE FUTURE OF EPA ENFORCEMENT MECHANISMS:
OPTIONS AND FINALITY
The Supreme Court’s decision in Sackett will have an impact on
how EPA will enforce the CWA. The most certain impact of Sackett will
be the judicial reviewability of CWA administrative compliance orders
Id.
Id.
Id. at 1374.
Id.
Sackett, 132 S. Ct. at 1374 (emphasis added).
Id.
Id.
See id. at 1369, 1374.
See supra, Circuit Split Prior to Supreme Court’s Decision in Sackett v. U.S.
Env’t Prot. Agency,
233. Sackett, 132 S. Ct. at 1374.
224.
225.
226.
227.
228.
229.
230.
231.
232.
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issued by EPA.234 In light of the Court’s decision in Sackett, we are left
with a two-part test to “determin[e] whether pre-enforcement review of
EPA administrative action is allowed”: (1) is the administrative compliance order a “final action” under the APA, and if so (2) “does the applicable statute expressly preclude pre-enforcement . . . review” of such
order? 235 Practitioners should expect the court to examine whether a
challenged agency action is final before examining whether the underlying statutory scheme precludes judicial review. Thus, many believe the
EPA will need to be selective about when it issues an administrative
compliance order.236
Despite the belief that there will be a positive impact against EPA,
there are concerns within the industry regarding the Court’s decision.
Specifically, many are concerned that judicial review will not occur immediately, the process will be cumbersome for smaller parties like the
Sacketts, and EPA and the Corps will exert more resources, as EPA will
have to compile an administrative record for each issued administrative
compliance order.237 However, the benefits afforded to property owners,
such as a fair and equitable process, outweigh these concerns. Furthermore, obtaining judicial review adds rationality and equity to EPA’s enforcement scheme and is a significant step towards oversight of EPA.
To better incorporate Sackett and to better administer and issue
administrative compliance orders, EPA should consider two recommendations: (1) continue issuing administrative compliance orders to recipients, however, in order to continue to allow EPA to respond quickly to
ongoing violations, the orders must be altered so as to not trigger judicial reviewability under the APA or (2) begin administering less formal
communications such as NOVs as long as they don’t trigger the “final”
action test as laid out in Bennett v. Spear. Either option will allow EPA
to continue to abate and control pollution and ensure compliance with
current and future environmental laws with the same determination,
aggressiveness, and urgency as EPA does today. Such recommendations
ensure everyday property owners are not run over and annihilated in
the process, but also take into consideration what is fair and equitable.

Schiff, supra note 144, at 134.
Leslie Garrett Allen & Chris Carron, Sackett v. EPA: Implications for Administrative Compliance, 44 NO. 1 ABA TRENDS 23, 26 (2012) (discussing the Sackett v. U.S.
E.P.A. decision and its implications).
236. See id. at 27.
237. See, e.g., Lowell Rothschild, Despite Sackett Ruling, Industry Still Faces Challenges with EPA in Permitting and Enforcement Matters, ENERGY LEGAL BLOG (Jul. 19,
2012, 9:16 AM), http://www.energylegalblog.com/archives/2012/07/19/4014.
234.
235.
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A. Recommendation One: The Continued Use of Administrative
Compliance Orders
Pondered questions after Sackett: Has Sackett had any impact on
EPA’s decision to issue or not issue administrative compliance orders?
How many administrative compliance orders have been issued? How
does the data compare to 2011? The empirical data indicate that Sackett
may have had some influence. Specifically, in 2013, EPA issued 873 administrative compliance orders under all major environmental statutes.238
Enforcement Annual Result Numbers at a Glance for Fiscal Year (FY) 2013
Civil Enforcement and Compliance Activities239
Referrals of Civil Judicial Enforcement Cases to Department of
Justice (DOJ)
Supplemental Referrals of Civil Judicial Enforcement Cases to
DOJ

138
25

Civil Judicial Complaints Filed with Court

137

Civil Judicial Enforcement Case Conclusions

176

Administrative Penalty Order Complaints

1,407

Final Administrative Penalty Orders

1,440

Administrative Compliance Orders

873

Cases with Supplemental Environmental Projects

110

Inspections/Evaluations

18,000

In 2011, EPA issued 1,324 administrative compliance orders.240 In
2013, EPA issued 451 fewer administrative compliance orders under its
enforcement scheme than it issued in 2011. 241 EPA officials have not
directly and definitively stated that they issued fewer administrative
compliance orders due to the Sackett decision. However, it is hard not to
believe that the Court’s decision in Sackett was the reason why 35%
fewer administrative compliance orders were issued in 2013. Although
many scholars, practitioners, and industry groups believed the Sackett
238. ENFORCEMENT ANNUAL RESULTS NUMBERS AT A GLANCE FOR FISCAL YEAR (FY)
2013, U.S. ENV’L. PROT. AGENCY, http://www2.epa.gov/enforcement/enforcement-annualresults-numbers-glance-fiscal-year-fy-2013 (last visited May 28, 2014).
239. Id.
240. U.S. ENV’L. PROT. AGENCY, END OF YEAR DATA AND TRENDS 2011
ACCOMPLISHMENTS, COMPLIANCE AND ENFORCEMENT ANNUAL RESULTS 2011 FISCAL YEAR,
http://www.epa.gov/compliance/resources/reports/endofyear/eoy2011/eoy-data.html (last visited May 28, 2014) [hereinafter END OF YEAR DATA AND TRENDS 2011 ACCOMPLISHMENTS].
241. Id. (stating EPA issued 1,324 administrative compliance orders).
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decision was the death knell for administrative compliance orders, EPA
is clearly issuing administrative compliance orders in many contexts.
Therefore, although 35% is very significant, it appears EPA is not facing
as grim of a future as what many believed.
Although the data indicates fewer administrative compliance orders have been issued in 2013, EPA has made it clear it will continue to
issue administrative compliance orders. Mark Pollins, a top EPA official
indicated as much during an American Law Institute–American Bar
Association event on May 3, 2012.242 Pollins stated that the Sackett decision would have very little effect on how EPA enforces the CWA. 243
Additionally, Pollins indicated that EPA would continue to use administrative compliance orders under the CWA, despite the Court’s ruling.244
When asked “What’s available after Sackett?” Pollins responded, “Pretty
much everything that was available before Sackett . . . internally it’s the
same old, same old.”245 Pollins further stated that the Court’s ruling in
Sackett did not limit EPA’s authority to issue administrative compliance
orders nor did it limit their applicability as the “[Supreme Court] did not
hold the compliance order was substantially deficient.” 246
On March 21, 2013, EPA issued a Memorandum explaining that
following the Sackett v. U.S. Env’t Prot. Agency decision EPA will begin
adding language to administrative compliance orders issued under the
CWA to ensure that recipients of such orders are aware of their opportunity to seek pre-enforcement judicial review.247 Specifically, the language states “Respondent may seek federal judicial review of the Order
pursuant to Chapter 7 of the Administrative Procedure Act, 5 U.S.C. §§
701-706.248 However, the agency “may need to take extra steps to ensure
that its decision is supported by a comprehensive administrative record
that allows the order to withstand judicial review.” 249 Informing the recipient of their right to seek pre-enforcement judicial review is a step
forward but only one step.

Linda Roeder, EPA Official Sees No Major Shift in Agency’s Use of Compliance
BLOOMBERG BNA (May 4, 2012), http://www.bna.com/epa-official-seesn12884909211/.
243. Id.
244. Bridget DiCosmo, Downplaying High Court Ruling, EPA Floats Options for
CWA Enforcement, INSIDEEPA.COM (MAY 7, 2012), http://insideepa.com/Inside-EPAGeneral/Inside-EPA-Public-Content/downplaying-high-court-ruling-epa-floats-options-forcwa-enforcement/menu-id-565.html.
245. Id.
246. Roeder, supra note 242.
247. U.S. ENV’L. PROT. AGENCY, LANGUAGE REGARDING JUDICIAL REVIEW OF
CERTAIN ADMINISTRATIVE ENFORCEMENT ORDERS FOLLOWING THE SUPREME COURT
DECISION
IN
SACKETT
V.
EPA,
EPA
(2013),
http://www2.epa.gov/sites/production/files/documents/languageregarding-sackett032113.pdf.
248. Id. at 3.
249. W. Parker Moore, Supreme Court to EPA: CWA Compliance Orders Are Subject
to Review, ABA ENVT’L LITIG. AND TOXIC TORTS COMM. NEWSLETTER, Jul. 2012, at 7, 8.
242.

Orders,
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In order for EPA to continue to issue administrative compliance orders effectively, the orders must not be a “final” agency action and must
not trigger judicial review under the APA. Thus, although EPA has altered administrative compliance orders to provide awareness of preenforcement judicial review, administrative compliance orders must still
be altered further. As previously discussed “final” agency action is judicially reviewable under the APA when the action: (1) “mark[s] the ‘consummation’ of the agency’s decision-making process,” and (2) is “one by
which ‘rights or obligations have been determined,’ or from which ‘legal
consequences will flow.’” 250 Thus for proper implementation of option
one, EPA must take two necessary actions to ensure administrative
compliance orders do not trigger judicial reviewability under the APA.
First, EPA will need to guarantee notice and an opportunity to be
heard prior to assessing penalties. “[A]dministrative agencies must engage in individualized decision-making and observe additional procedural due process guarantees . . . [such as], notice and the opportunity
to be heard.”251 Under this option, EPA will be required to provide notice
to the recipient of the alleged violation and an informal hearing where
the recipient can explain their actions and gain more information prior
to assessing penalties. Upon doing so, the administrative compliance
order will not mark the consummation of EPA’s decision-making thus,
circumventing the first prong of the final agency action test.
Second, EPA will need to refrain from exposing the recipient or alleged violator to penalties for violating the applicable statute, and imposing upon the recipient an obligation to restore their property in accordance with EPA’s orders until a hearing has been conducted. Conducting an actual hearing will ensure that the recipient’s rights and obligations are not determined until the recipient has had an opportunity
to be heard. Upon doing so, EPA will avoid the second prong of the final
agency action test.
Both actions just described rest on one necessary requirement—an
actual, direct, and meaningful public hearing. Currently, EPA obeys the
CWA enforcement statute, 33 U.S.C. § 1319, however, upon a closer inspection, as in Sackett, it is clear EPA has not been properly following
through with its obligations.252 It is safe to say EPA provides notice to
alleged violators through means such as administrative compliance orders and an opportunity to be heard as set forth by the statute, however
EPA repeatedly denies recipients an actual, direct, and meaningful
hearing where the recipient can explain their actions and ask questions
in order to better understand the agency’s actions, requirements, and
reasons behind the alleged violation.253 It would seem EPA finds it easi250. Bennett v. Spear, 520 U.S. 154, 178 (1997) (quoting Chicago & Southern Air
Lines, Inc. v. Waterman S.S. Corp., 333 U.S. 103, 113 (1948); Port of Bos. Marine Terminal
Ass’n. v. Rederiaktiebolaget Transatlantic, 400 U.S. 62, 71 (1970)).
251. Adler, supra note 103, at 155; see also Londoner v. Denver, 210 U.S. 373 (1908).
252. See Sackett v. U.S. Env’t Prot. Agency, 132 S. Ct. 1367 (2012).
253. See, e.g., id.; Tenn. Valley Auth. v. Whitman, 336 F.3d 1236 (11th Cir. 2003).
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er and more time efficient to deny recipients a hearing, move on to the
next step in the enforcement process—assessing penalties—and eventually move on to the next case.254 It is absolutely necessary that EPA take
that extra step and refrain from denying recipients direct public hearings in order to first, fully comply with 33 U.S.C. § 1319 and second, to
better provide a fair and equitable determination that is expected under
the law. Only then, will EPA be able to circumvent the entire final agency action test as set forth in Bennett v. Spear and restated by the Court.
It could appear that the actions—ensuring notice and an actual opportunity to be heard and refraining from exposing recipients to penalties prior to conducting an actual direct hearing—may be difficult for
EPA to implement because such actions are not prevalent within EPA,
however they are not impossible and conversely are realistic so long as
EPA puts in the necessary time. Upon implementation, EPA can continue to issue administrative compliance orders without fear that they will
be reviewed under the APA. This will take more time and effort on
EPA’s behalf, yet compared to the time spent litigating such matters in
court, such time will be minimal and considered well spent.
Although Pollins stated on behalf of the agency that EPA will continue to issue administrative compliance orders,255 such orders are not
the only tool at EPA’s disposal or at its discretional use. Specifically,
EPA may use less formal means of communication such as NOVs.
Therefore, the second option recommended by this article suggests EPA
retire administrative compliance orders and begin using this informal
type of communication.
B. Recommendation Two – Notice of Violation
Justice Scalia foreshadowed during oral argument in Sackett that
EPA may “try to issue parties warnings that cannot be enforced,” notify
recipients of their potential violation, and inform recipients of the potential monetary penalties they face if they do not comply. 256 Doing so
would not implicate judicial review because the actions would not be
final agency actions or impose any penalties. NOVs fall into this warning category.257 However, to date there is limited information available
on this type of warning.
The Clean Air Act (CAA) issues NOVs to avoid judicial review.258
Section 7413(a)(1) of the CAA provides that “EPA may issue a notice of
violation when the Administrator finds that any person has violated or
is in violation of any requirement or prohibition of an implementation

254.
255.
256.
257.
258.

See, e.g., Sackett, 132 S. Ct 1367; Whitman, 336 F.3d 1236.
Roeder, supra note 242.
Rothschild, supra note 48, at 52.
See DiCosmo, supra note 244.
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plan or permit.”259 After a thirty-day grace period has expired, the EPA
may pursue other enforcement options such as issuing an administrative compliance order, imposing an administrative penalty, or bringing a
civil action.260 Additionally, the EPA states on its website that NOVs are
just one step in the EPA’s investigation and enforcement statutes and
regulations.261 EPA further indicated that
A[n] NOV notifies the recipient that EPA believes the recipient
committed one or more violations and provides instructions for
coming into compliance. NOVs typically offer an opportunity for
the recipient to discuss their actions, including efforts to
achieve compliance. NOVs are not a final EPA determination
that a violation has occurred. EPA considers all appropriate information to determine the final enforcement response.262
Essentially, NOVs inform an alleged violator of a suspected violation they have committed and lay out potential enforcement options attempting to convince the alleged violator to work with EPA in order to
come into compliance. 263 Finally, NOVs provide for an opportunity to
meet, and do not impose penalties. 264 Thus, it is clear NOVs are not final
agency action and thus are not subject to judicial review. NOVs do not
trigger the final agency action test in Bennett v. Spear because NOVs do
not mark the consummation of the agency’s decision-making process as
NOVs are just one step of many in the EPA’s investigation and they
provide an opportunity for the recipient to discuss their actions. Additionally, the rights or obligations of the recipient have not been determined and legal consequences do not flow therefrom.
Therefore, because NOVs do not trigger the final agency action test
EPA may administer them in place of administrative compliance orders
all the while still satisfying their enforcement obligations—ceasing the
discharge of harmful pollutants—and furthering their main objective of
abating and controlling pollution and providing recipients an opportunity to be heard in a fair and equitable way.
Despite industry concerns surrounding the Sackett decision, both
recommendations are advantageous to EPA and to property owners everywhere. Specifically, property owners are afforded a fair and equitable
adjudication as required by the law and EPA is able to issue administrative compliance orders without fear they will be judicially reviewable
259. DAVID R. WOOLEY & ELIZABETH M. MORSS, CLEAN AIR ACT HANDBOOK § 11:2
(22nd ed. 2012).
260. Id.
261. U.S. ENV’L. PROT. AGENCY, WHAT IS A NOTICE OF VIOLATION (NOV)? , U.S.
ENV’L.
PROT.
AGENCY,
http://compliance.supportportal.com/link/portal/23002/23009/Article/32970/What-is-a-Noticeof-Violation-NOV (last visited May 28, 2014).
262. Id.
263. DiCosmo, supra note 244.
264. See WOOLEY & MORSS, supra note 259.
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and thus, it will avoid expensive litigating costs in the long run. Therefore, either recommendation would be suitable for EPA to implement.
VII. CONCLUSION
The Supreme Court’s decision in Sackett is a small although important step in providing a more thorough oversight of EPA, and ensuring recipients are afforded notice and an actual, direct, and meaningful
opportunity to be heard as required by law. Over time, the hope is the
decision will improve compliance and further EPA’s goals of protecting
the environment in which we live. However, the implementation of either recommendation—the continued use of administrative compliance
orders or NOVs—goes one step further by providing EPA with the ability to continue to utilize enforcement mechanisms without concern of
judicial review and extensive litigating costs.
Moreover, it is evident Sackett has influenced EPA’s issuance of
administrative compliance orders as indicated from the collected empirical data. However, it appears that EPA is not facing as grim a future as
many believed, and administrative compliance orders will continue to be
used regularly.

Tori Osler
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